


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1962/10/22

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State



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Action

Control: 17120

SS

Rec'd: October 23, 1962
9:19 a.m.

Info

FROM: Port-au-Prince

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 212, October 22, 8 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED BY PB Murray DATE 2/10/88
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After preliminary call on Foreign Minister as instructed Circular 700 I called on Duvalier at 5 p.m. accompanied by Thomas. Chalmers and Raymond were also present.

After going carefully over main points President's speech, his letter and related instructions reference Circular, I told him this was gravest matter we have yet discussed and that positions taken by our allies on this question will have decisive impact on our over-all relations with them for long time to come. I added that I recalled Duvalier's remark in our conversation in September on occasion of Prime Minister visit (EMBTel 161) to effect that no matter what linguistic differences existed in international conferences a vote was understood in any language.

Duvalier was characteristically evasive. I pressed him several times to come up with concrete indications of GOH position in OAS, UN and on question of military collaboration, and he refused to be pinned down. He emphasized that he had created milice civile to deal with Communist threat and that he would look to them to guard coast of Haiti. He asked me to convey his advice that we should make very careful soundings of our friends in order that we would avoid being isolated. It is doubtful that Duvalier has any basis as yet for talking about our isolation but he himself is probably embarking on just such soundings

-beginning-

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-2- 212, October 22, 8 p.m. from Port-au-Prince

beginning right now. I told him that I was sure most of our friends were with us and that while we were patient and tolerant people, once we had decided our vital interests were at stake, we kept moving ahead.

Picking up his pointed reference to Milice Civile, I said I was aware of our previous discussions on this question which had become something of issue between us and that our advice was sincerely intended to be for national good of Haiti. If in present crisis we enter into new phase of military collaboration perhaps then even problem of Milice Civile could be solved. I emphasized that collaboration on military side between us could be easily achieved on basis of relationship which two governments had had in such matters since 1959. It seemed best to avoid specific reference to sending of representative of JCS.

Because I was not authorized to hand him copy of text of President's speech (DEPTEL 710) and had not yet received texts of resolutions we intend submit in OAS and UN, only paper I could leave with Duvalier was President's brief letter. He took full advantage of these omissions to say his government would have to study matter in light of complete documentation.

Atmosphere of meeting was not unfriendly and Duvalier' said some agreeable things about recognizing gravity of situation and traditional friendship between US and Haiti. My general impression is that he was quite pleased that it had become necessary for us to come to him with request for support in matter of vital importance to US interest. On other hand I continue believe that he will find it in his interests to come along with us eventually, particularly if we succeed in getting substantial support from our other OAS allies. Should he, however, prove obstreperous then we must indeed give urgent and renewed consideration to problem of getting rid of this weakest link in Caribbean chain.

THURSTON

DMB

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NOTE: Advanc copy S/SO 10:15 AM 10/23/ -JSW.